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Abstract
There is an ongoing debate about the deployment rates and composition of alternative ener-
gy plans that could feasibly displace fossil fuels globally by mid-century, as required to
avoid the more extreme impacts of climate change. Here we demonstrate the potential for a
large-scale expansion of global nuclear power to replace fossil-fuel electricity production,
based on empirical data from the Swedish and French light water reactor programs of the
1960s to 1990s. Analysis of these historical deployments show that if the world built nuclear
power at no more than the per capita rate of these exemplar nations during their national ex-
pansion, then coal- and gas-fired electricity could be replaced worldwide in less than a de-
cade. Under more conservative projections that take into account probable constraints and
uncertainties such as differing relative economic output across regions, current and past
unit construction time and costs, future electricity demand growth forecasts and the retiring
of existing aging nuclear plants, our modelling estimates that the global share of fossil-fuel-
derived electricity could be replaced within 25–34 years. This would allow the world to meet
the most stringent greenhouse-gas mitigation targets.
Introduction
Human industrial and agricultural activity is now the principal cause of changes in the Earth’s
atmospheric composition of long-lived greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide (CO2), and
will be the driving force of climate change in the 21st century [1]. More than 190 nations have
agreed on the need to limit fossil-fuel emissions to mitigate anthropogenic climate change, as
formalized in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change [2]. However, the compet-
ing global demand for low-cost and reliable energy and electricity to fuel the rapid economic
development of countries like China and India has led to a large expansion of energy produc-
tion capacity based predominantly on fossil fuels. Because of this, human-caused greenhouse-
gas emissions continue to increase, even though the threat of climate change from the burning
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of fossil fuels is widely recognized [3]. There is therefore an urgent need to assess what energy-
generation technologies could allow for deep cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions and air pollu-
tion while simultaneously allowing for a rapid expansion of economic activity and prosperity
in the poorer regions of the world.
Much recent attention has been given to the potential of, and constraints on, renewable en-
ergy [4]. Here we take a different tack, by making use of historical data from the Swedish nucle-
ar program to model the feasibility of a massive expansion of nuclear power at a rate sufficient
to largely replace the current electricity production from fossil fuel sources by mid-century—
the time window for achieving the least-emissions pathway (representative concentration path-
way 2.6 or lower) as set out in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [5]. In a supporting analysis we also model France as a case study; the French
example provides an excellent example of a significantly larger nation also pursuing an electric-
ity production policy for a prolonged period based almost entirely on nuclear energy. As part
of this analysis, we detail the impact nuclear power had on historical Swedish and French CO2
emissions, define the rate nuclear capacity was added, estimate the cost and construction time
in these national nuclear programs, finally, show how they can be compared meaningfully to
the current global situation.
Why consider a large-scale nuclear scenario? The operation of a nuclear reactor does not
emit greenhouse gases or other forms of particulate air pollution, and it is one of few base-load
alternatives to fossil energy sources currently available that has been proven by historical expe-
rience to be able to be significantly expanded and scaled up [6]. Large-hydro projects are geo-
graphically constrained and typical have widespread impacts on river basins [7]. The land use
[8], and biodiversity [9] aspects of a large-scale expansion of biomass for energy make its use as
a sustainable global energy source questionable.
Monetary values presented in this paper are, unless otherwise stated, reported in the value
of the US dollar in 2005. When needed, inflation adjustments were done using data as provided
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The year 2005 was chosen rather than 2014 because it is
the current reference year for most major databases, including the World Bank data, and the
reader can thus directly verify numbers appearing in this paper without the need for inflation
adjustments. All gross domestic product (GDP) data are presented in the original form, not
corrected by purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates. Using GDP-data that has not been
PPP-adjusted gives more conservative results, since Swedish PPP-adjusted GDP is lower than
the un-adjusted GDP for the entire time-span of interest [10]. Source data and the calculations
used for all numbers presented in this paper are provided in the S1 Dataset.
Nuclear capacity impact on CO2 emissions in Sweden
Between 1960 and 1990 Sweden more than doubled its inflation-adjusted gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita while reducing its per capita CO2 emissions through a rapid expansion of
nuclear power production. The reduction in CO2 emissions was not an objective but rather a
fortunate by-product, since the effect on the climate by greenhouse-gas emissions was not a
factor in political discourse until much more recently. Nuclear power was introduced to reduce
dependence on imported oil and to protect four major Swedish rivers from hydropower instal-
lations [11]. As illustrated in Fig 1, in the pre-nuclear era (1960–1972), the rise in Swedish CO2
emissions matched and even exceeded the relative increase in economic output. Once commer-
cial nuclear power capacity was brought online, however, starting with the Oskarshamn-1
plant in 1972, emissions started to decline rapidly. By 1986, half of the electrical output of the
country came from nuclear power plants, and total CO2 emissions per capita (from all sources)
had been slashed by 75% from the peak level of 1970.
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Based on the data available in the World Bank database, this appears to be the most rapid
installation of low-CO2 electricity capacity on a per capita basis of any nation in history (France
and the U.S. installed more total nuclear capacity in the 1960 to 1980s, but less than Sweden on
a per capita basis) [12]. Thus Sweden provides a historical benchmark ‘best-case scenario’ on
which to judge the potential for future nuclear expansion.
Nuclear electricity costs in Sweden have always included a surcharge corresponding to the
full estimated costs of researching, building and operating a final repository for all nuclear
waste. At the end of the nuclear expansion period, Swedish electricity prices (including taxes
and surcharges) were among the lowest in the world, and the running cost of the nuclear plants
(per kilowatt hour [kWh] produced) were lower than all other sources except for existing hy-
dropower installations [13].
Emissions were reduced due to the closing of fossil power plants and the electrification (by
nuclear power) of heating and industrial processes that were previously fossil powered. The
total energy supply from crude oil and oil-derivative products dropped by 40% (from 350 tera-
watt hours per year [TWh/y] to 209 TWh/y) in the period 1970–1986. In the same time period,
total electricity consumption doubled and the use of electricity for heating expanded by 5.5
times (from 4.7 TWh/y to 25.8 TWh/y) [14].
The rate at which nuclear electricity production can be added
Out of the 12 commercial reactors that were built in Sweden, nine were of completely indige-
nous designs that were developed without the use of foreign licenses [11]. Another two reactors
of indigenous design were exported to Finland and started operation during the same period
(1979–1982). Research on commercial boiling water reactor (BWR) technology was initiated in
Sweden in 1962. This means it took 24 years from the start of research until the technology
provided a large proportion of the electricity output of the nation. The Swedish BWR develop-
ment benefitted greatly from the fact that the US had already demonstrated the principles of
the technology (the BORAX experiment series [15]) and had started to put small BWRs of
General Electric design online in the 1960s [16].
The rate of addition of nuclear electricity in Sweden is presented in several different ways in
Table 1. The values represent the cumulative change in nuclear electricity production over the
period, divided by the number of years and a normalization factor (either GDP/capita or popu-
lation). For example the period 1975–1986 starts with the change in production between 1974
Fig 1. Swedish total CO2 emissions and GDP per capita 1960–1990, normalized to the level of 1960.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124074.g001
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and 1975, and ends with the change in production between 1985 and 1986. The values are then
divided by the total number of production years in the span, in this case 12 years.
To put these numbers in a wider perspective, the number of years it would take to replace
current global fossil fuel electricity production was calculated (weighted by population and
economy) in the two right columns of the table. These estimates were based on current global
data that is summarized in Table 2. Although the range of values in Table 1 is large, the analysis
reveals that there is no way of selecting and weighing the available data that leads to an estimat-
ed replacement time for current fossil fuel electricity longer than two decades. These values
should not be confused with the values given in Section 5, which also accounts for the replace-
ment of the current nuclear fleet and the relative rates at which global energy consumption and
GDP are growing.
In order to build nuclear power plants at any of the rates of Table 1 on a global scale, nearly
all construction would have to occur in countries with an already established and experienced
nuclear regulatory and licensing infrastructure in place, at least in the initial expansion period.
This fact presents no major hurdle since virtually all major world energy consumers, encom-
passing over 90 percent of global CO2 emissions, are nuclear power producers with active regu-
latory institutions [19].
Two features seen in all relatively rapidly expanding and successful nuclear programs were
strong government involvement and support as well as some measure of technology standardi-
zation (indigenously designed PWRs in France, BWRs in Sweden). In this study we make no
attempt at identifying and quantifying all the specific factors (societal, institutional, political,
economical, technological) that enabled the rapid expansion of nuclear power in countries like
Sweden and France. The question is highly complex and it is not clear whether the results of
Table 2. Global projected population, economy and fossil electricity for 2014/2015.
Parameter Value Source
Total gross domestic product (GDP) 7.67 x 1013 $ (2014 US$) [17]
6.37 x 1013 $ (2005 US$)
Population 7.21 billion [12]
GDP/Capita 10654 $ (2014 US$) [17] [12]
8843$ (2005 US$)
Fossil fuel electricity generation 1.51 x 1013 kWh/y (Projection is for 2015) [18]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124074.t002
Table 1. Production addition for the Swedish nuclear program and implications for global deployment rates of nuclear power if the same progres-
sion was followed worldwide.
Time period Production addition Years to replace current
global fossil electricity at
Swedish rate globally
kWh/y/y/capita kWh/y/y/1k$-GDP Per capita Per GDP
Start of research to last grid connection, 1962–1986 322.5 12.4 6.5 19.2
Start of ﬁrst construction to last grid connection, 1966–1986 383.9 14.7 5.5 16.1
First grid connection to last grid connection, 1972–1986 536.6 20.6 3.9 11.5
“Steady-state” addition period 1975–1986 652.3 24.9 3.2 9.5
Peak 5-year addition 1982–1986 740.0 26.5 2.8 8.9
Low 5-year addition (after 1972) 1976–1980 336.4 13.7 6.2 17.3
Peak addition year per capita 1986 1326.2 46.1 1.6 5.1
Peak addition year per $GDP 1981 1286.0 50.2 1.6 4.7
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124074.t001
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such a study are applicable globally. This study aims to show at what rate one can add nuclear
production capacity in the “best case” scenarios as seen historically.
Countries adopting or expanding their nuclear production capacity today have compara-
tively little need to develop indigenous designs and supply chains in the way Sweden did, since
turn-key products are available from a number of vendors on an open competitive market. It is
considerably easier to buy plants and nuclear fuel internationally today than it was in the early
days of the Swedish nuclear program, with a larger number of mature, internationally marketed
commercial designs on offer today compared to the situation of the mid 1960s. There is also a
larger and more open fuel-supply market. Large collaborations such as the International
Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (formerly known as GNEP), with 64 participating
and observing nations have recently been set up to facilitate the safe and efficient expansion of
nuclear power globally [20].
The historical data shows that as time progresses, the impact on the average addition rate
caused by the initial time lag—where energy-generation installations are being planned, li-
censed and built but have not yet been put online (in the Swedish case; 1966–1972)—dimin-
ishes. Once the initial ramp-up period is over and the first installations begin to come online,
the rate of addition will approach a steady state. By 1974/1975, Sweden had reached a steady-
state rate of capacity addition that was essentially maintained for more than a decade, as seen
in Fig 2.
The Swedish experience indicates that in steady-state phase of capacity expansion, nuclear
power can be added at a rate of about 25 kWh/y/y/1k$-GDP, which, if multiplied by current
global GDP (Table 2), amounts to ~1500 TWh/y/y (i.e., 10% of current global fossil-fuel elec-
tricity production when scaled to the worldwide economy). The peak annual addition rate per
GDP in Sweden occurred 1980–1981 and corresponds to a GDP-weighted annual addition of
3000 TWh/y, or 20% of the current global fossil-fuel electricity production.
Unit cost and construction time
Despite the uncertainties on the economics and logistics of the recent nuclear expansion [21],
the current global unit cost and construction-time of nuclear reactors are actually quite compa-
rable to the Swedish experience. The relevant Swedish historical and modern (last two years) of
data are presented in Table 3.
With the exception of single first-of-a-kind projects like the highly delayed and poorly man-
aged European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) at Olkilouto in Finland [22] and Flamanville in
Fig 2. Swedish nuclear electricity production 1966–1986 [14].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124074.g002
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France [23], global data does not suggest that nuclear plants are necessarily significantly more
expensive (as a fraction of the total economy) or time-consuming to build now than in the
past, if efficiently managed. Recent studies by the European Commission report that new nu-
clear generation is economically favorable versus other generation sources, especially if all ex-
ternalities of other generation sources as well would be internalized [24]. In addition, recently
published data suggest that cost escalations in the French nuclear program have been much
smaller than previously stated, and that the cost escalation seen was caused to a large part by
excessive scale-up of the reactor units [25]. The recent global focus on small modular reactors
(SMRs) has the potential to greatly reduce both complexity and uncertainty regarding con-
struction times for new reactor projects.
While historic construction time data is available and reliable [16], cost-data is generally not
clearly defined and in some cases not available at all. For the data of Table 3, all cost data for
the recently constructed reactors are taken from press-releases due to the lack of officially pub-
lished source data. It is worth noting is that only three countries connected new reactors to the
grid in 2012–2014: China, India and South Korea. Data from these countries (particularly
China and India) are arguably most important to future global CO2 emissions reduction, be-
cause these populous and rapidly industrializing nations will constitute the bulk of energy de-
mand and new production in the coming decades. While the cost of construction is currently
stable or falling in these countries, a global expansion of nuclear power would mean increased
operating costs as the price of uranium ore and fuel is driven up, at least until generation IV re-
actors that use recycled spent nuclear fuel and depleted uranium or thorium as their input, be-
come widespread and economically competitive. The expansion of nuclear power production
inevitably entails a proportional expansion of pressure-vessel fabrication capacity (large steel-
forging presses) as well an expansion of the entire nuclear fuel cycle: mining, enrichment, fuel
fabrication, recycling/reprocessing and disposal. A truly global and sustainable expansion of
the type analyzed here would necessitate a transition to fast reactor systems before the turn of
the century to ensure adequate fuel supply and near-complete recycling of long-lived actinide
wastes [26].
Table 3. Nuclear power plant construction time and cost comparison [11] [16] [12].




# of units 8 12
Median unit capacity (MWe) 1018 935
Average unit capacity (MWe) 990 871
Median unit construction time 5.1 years 5.7 years
Average unit construction time 5.8 years 5.9 years
Median over-night unit cost per
kWe (2005 USD)
1364* ~1400–1500†
Average over-night unit cost per
kWe (2005 USD)
1546 ~1400–1500†
*Reactor cost data for recently constructed reactors was collected from ofﬁcial press releases. When costs
were only given as a lumped sum for multiple units at a plant, the cost for a single unit was calculated by
multiplying the total plant cost by the power output of the unit relative to the total plant power output.
†Only speciﬁc cost data for the Ringhals NPP and Oskarshamn NPP was found [11]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124074.t003
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Implications, Caveats and the French Experience
A surprising and encouraging result of our analysis is that the estimated time it would take the
world to replace the fossil share of total electricity with nuclear power, based on Swedish expe-
rience, is less than two decades (see Table 1 for details). Moreover, this projection is grounded
in reality, being based on actual historical experience rather than speculation on future techno-
logical and cost developments. This number takes in to account both the relative difference in
per capita GDP between the global average today and Sweden at the time (both adjusted for in-
flation to the 2005 level of USD), and it also includes the total planning and build time of all
the reactors and the associated regulatory infrastructure.
Replacing fossil-fuel electricity and heat production eliminates roughly half of the total
source of anthropogenic CO2 emissions [12]. Continued nuclear build-out at this demonstra-
bly modest rate (Sweden was not, at that time, motivated by urgent concerns like climate-
change mitigation), coupled with an electrification of the transportation systems (electric cars,
increased high-speed rail use etc.) could reduce global CO2 emissions by ~70% well before
2050.
However, global electricity production has grown at a more rapid rate than GDP/capita av-
eraged over the last decade (+26% vs. +16% between 2000 and 2011) [12]. The rapidly increas-
ing demand for electricity in economically less-developed countries and the closing of aging
existing nuclear installations built in the 1960s and 1970s makes the challenge of replacing the
share of fossil electricity even larger than it would first appear. Further, as electricity goals are
met progressively, the world will face the added task of replacing all final energy demand—in-
cluding transportation and industrial processes—with synthetic fuels and chemical batteries,
based on zero-carbon sources of heat and electricity [27]. Balancing these factors, which act to
increase the magnitude of the challenge, is the fact that today there is a mature world market
with dozens of proven and licensed commercial nuclear power plant designs, almost half a cen-
tury of engineering experience, and strong technology sharing and multilateral cooperation.
There is thus no need for most countries in the 21st century to develop their own indigenous
nuclear power plant designs (especially without the use of foreign licenses/patents), as was
done in the 20th century Swedish program.
GDP-weighted values of Table 1 have been used to estimate a realistic value for the time it
would take the world to replace current nuclear installations and all fossil fuel electricity by
new nuclear. As a “low” estimate, we use the average nuclear production addition per $-GDP
from start of research to the last grid connection (1962–1986); this provides an absolute upper
bound for the time-to-replace estimation. An arguably more realistic estimate is the addition
rate from the start of the first nuclear construction until the last grid connection (1966–1986).
In this scenario, the first 6 years see no electricity production added at all. While Table 1 shows
addition rates have exceed 3 times this rate, it can be used as an upper bound for a worldwide
nuclear expansion. Sweden was used as the example in this paper since it is the country that
Table 4. Data used for global nuclear expansion rate estimations.
Fossil fuel electricity and all current nuclear electricity (2015 projection) [18] 1.77 x 1013 kWh/y
Addition due to the estimated difference between GDP growth and electricity
demand growth
+20%
Total electricity generation to be supplied by new nuclear power plants + 20% / per
current world GDP
2.13 x 1013 kWh/y
Current (2014) global GDP [17] 6.37 x 1013 $ (2005
US$)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124074.t004
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has done the most rapid and (relative to its size) largest nuclear expansion of any nation, and
thus provides an empirical estimate for how quickly such an expansion can be done. However,
since Sweden is a small nation, an additional analysis was performed that also includes an ex-
trapolation based on the much larger nuclear program of France. The relevant input data for
this analysis is summarized in Table 4.
Recent data has shown that electricity demand has outpaced GDP growth by about 10% av-
eraged over the last decade. To remain cautious in our future projections, a 20% future lag be-
tween GDP growth and electricity demand was introduced as shown in Table 4. This assumes
a 20% increase in electricity production will need to be replaced per current-world GDP. The
resulting time to replace the current global fossil-fuelled electricity production and the current
nuclear fleet is given in Table 5.
Given this context, the low-rate estimate of the time for fossil electricity replacement based
on Swedish data is 27.0 years and the high-rate estimate is 22.7 years. Averaging the high and
low estimates, the conclusion is that nuclear power could replace fossil within a time span of
approximately 25 ± 2 years. Using the data from the somewhat slower but larger-scale nuclear
expansion in France in an identical way gives a best estimate time of replacement of
34 ± 4 years.
Even a cautious extrapolation of real historic data of regional nuclear power expansion pro-
grams to a global scale, as shown in Table 5, indicate that new nuclear power could replace all
fossil-fueled electricity production (including replacing all current nuclear electricity as well as
the projected rise in total electricity demand) in 25–34 years—well before mid-century, if
started soon.
Conclusion
Any climate change mitigation strategy will, due to the magnitude of the challenge, inevitably
be based on extrapolation of existing data and assumptions about the future. This is true
whether the technologies to displace the use of fossil fuel will be based on nuclear fission, fu-
sion, wind, solar, waves, geothermal, biomass, pumped-hydro, energy efficiency, smart grids,
electric cars or other technologies and any combination of the above. No renewable energy
technology or energy efficiency approach has ever been implemented on a scale or pace which
has resulted in the magnitude of reductions in CO2-emissions that is strictly required and im-
plied in any climate change mitigation study—neither locally nor globally, normalized by pop-
ulation or GDP or any other normalization parameter.
This paper makes an extrapolation of actual available historic data from regional expansions
of a low GHG-emitting energy technology, rather than trying to speculate further on future po-
tential deployment strategies. The results indicate that a replacement of current fossil-fuel elec-
tricity by nuclear fission at a pace which might limit the more severe effects of climate change
is technologically and industrially possible—whether this will in fact happen depends primarily
on political will, strategic economic planning, and public acceptance.
Table 5. Time to replace global fossil electricity and current nuclear fleet.
Country Sweden France
Expansion scenario Low High Low High
Time-span 1962–1986 1966–1986 1968–2000 1974–1995
GDP-weighted addition rate (kWh/y/y/1k$-GDP) 12.4 14.7 8.8 11.1
Time to replace global fossil electricity and current nuclear 27.0 years 22.7 years 38.1 years 30.0 years
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124074.t005
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